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Summary
Peacebuilders are blind when they fail to be sen-
sitive to local context, and arrogant when they do 
not secure local ownership for peacebuilding ef-
forts. Extant research suggests that this lack of at-
tention to context and ownership go a long way in 
accounting for the relative lack of success of peace-
building efforts, and so it is an issue that should be 
addressed by policy makers. Now, the importance 
of securing local ownership for peacebuilding ef-
forts have since long been recognized as critical 
to long-term success of peacebuilding efforts. The 
problem is that it is not implemented in practice. 
Why is this so? The report argues that it has to do 
with two implicit assumptions that are rarely dis-
cussed and reflected upon in peacebuilding circles. 
The first assumption is that universal knowledge 
is more important than local knowledge. The sec-
ond assumption is that international legitimacy is 
more important that domestic legitimacy. Together, 
these two assumptions make peacebuilding em-
phasize building and social engineering at the ex-
pense of facilitation, mediation and conflict reso-
lution. Because of its expertise, experience and 
international standing in peace and reconciliation 
work, in on-going efforts to professionalize peace-
building at the UN, and in UN reform efforts more 
generally, the Norwegian MFA is ideally placed 
to address these shortcomings of current peace-
building practice. Three areas are singled out as 
central to make peacebuilding less blind and arro-
gant: i) public-political debate about the appropri-
ate ends of peacebuilding; ii) institutional reform 
at the UN; and iii) the development of new hiring 
guidelines, training modules, and best practices.
Introduction
The policies of the UN, the World Bank, OECD-DAC 
and most bilateral donors have converged around a 
liberal peacebuilding model, where rule of law, market 
economy and democracy are seen as central to build 
a lasting peace. There are also procedural principles 
that are included in this consensus that stipulates how 
to proceed to build liberal democracies. The first prin-
ciple is that external actors need to respect and secure 
local ownership. The second is that that external ac-
tors need, wherever and whenever possible, to build 
on existing institutions and thus to take local context 
as their point of departure. While the substantive el-
ements of peacebuilding (i.e. democracy, rule of law, 
market economy) clearly define peacebuilding prac-
tice, the two procedural principles – ownership and 
context – are often neglected or marginalized. Extant 
research strongly suggests that this lack of attention 
to ownership and context go a long way in explaining 
why so many peacebuilding efforts are judged to be 
ineffective and unsustainable over time. In this policy 
brief, I seek to answer why securing ownership and 
sensitivity to context is preached but not practiced, 
and suggest what can be done to address it (see also 
Sending 2009).
Why ownership and sensitivity to context matters
While some studies show that important progress has 
been made in peacebuilding efforts over the course of 
the last decade or so (Human Security Report 2007), 
studies focused on the effectiveness of efforts to pre-
vent and stop violent conflicts paint a less positive 
picture. These studies find that the failure to build a 
sustainable peace range from 30 % of countries relaps-
ing into conflict within two years (Doyle and Sambanis 
2006) to 44% within five years (Mack 2007). A central 
factor accounting for the lack of sustainability over time 
is the inability of peacebuilders to secure and respect 
2Policy Brief 3 · 2009
local ownership and to build domestic, bottom-up legi-
timacy for their reforms that liberal peacebuilding en-
tails (Chandler 2006; Suhrke 2007; Richmond 2007; 
Paris and Sisk 2008. See also Collier and Dollar 2004). 
The importance of securing local ownership for 
peacebuilding efforts has since long been recognized 
as among the central principles by policy makers, as 
evidenced by key policy documents on peacebuilding. 
Why, then, do multilateral and bilateral actors not live 
by and implement the procedural principles of secur-
ing ownership and being sensitive to local context? 
The answer can be found in two implicit assumptions 
that underwrite peacebuilding policy and practice, but 
that are rarely discussed and reflected upon. The first 
assumption concerns the privileging of universal over 
local knowledge. The second assumption concerns the 
privileging of international over domestic sources of legiti-
macy. I discuss each in turn below.
Two illustrations: Universal knowledge, international 
legitimacy
1. Universal knowledge trumps local knowledge
The UN Secretary General has summarized what is ar-
guably common wisdom within the UN with regards 
to peacebuilding in saying that the role of the UN is to 
“help countries emerging from conflict build demo-
cratic institutions and entrench democratic norms. 
Today, the UN’s efforts to promote democracy are in-
separable from our broader work for security, devel-
opment and human rights.” (UNSG 2007) By mak-
ing post-conflict peacebuilding synonymous with the 
advancement of liberal democratic principles, peace-
building has become defined as a project that entails a 
comprehensive set of interventions aimed at re-build-
ing not only state institutions, but the very organiza-
tion of state-society relations.
Against this background, the authority of external ac-
tors in a post-conflict setting is not only derived from 
their humanitarian or legal mandate. It also stems in 
no small part from how peacebuilders claim to know 
what needs to be done to prevent future conflicts, 
and to help build a liberal democratic state. Because 
all peacebuilding efforts are modelled on and seek to 
advance goals associated with liberal principles, that 
knowledge is tied to expertise and experience in what 
these liberal principles are, how they should be made 
operational and how they should be implemented. Very 
schematically, we may say that the substantive content 
of peacebuilding is defined “top-down” (deductively) 
from a set of liberal principles stipulating how (ideal) 
societies should be organized and governed, and not 
“bottom-up” (inductively), where knowledge about 
what works is generated from concrete experience. 
These liberal principles are given from an “Archime-
dean” position where the means and ends of peace-
building are seen as a-historical and pre-political. In 
defining peacebuilding as being about efforts to im-
plement what are essentially non-negotiable princi-
ples about democratic rule, human rights, liberal eco-
nomic policy, rule of law etc, peacebuilders’ technical 
competence in and knowledge about the functionally 
specific tasks of how to reform the judicial sector, or 
the security sector, or the economy invariably takes 
precedence over local and context specific knowledge 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004). 
This feature of peacebuilding helps account for how it 
is that peacebuilding professionals with functionally 
specific expertise in a particular issue-area (security 
sector reform, rule of law, human rights, gender, etc) 
assume a position of authority in knowing what needs 
to be done in countries they often know little about. 
One becomes an “expert” by virtue of knowing about 
a functionally specific area, not by knowing about a 
particular country. This is exacerbated by a number of 
institutional constraints within the UN. For one, UN 
member states have put limits both on what the UN 
can do to gather “intelligence” on countries, and the 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is small and 
poorly equipped to track developments in different 
countries (Call and Cousens 2007). This is exacerbat-
ed by the fact that UN missions at the country level 
only to a very limited degree hire and make effective 
use of national and local staff. 
The result is often an inability on the part of peace-
builders to really understand what is going on in a 
country, resulting in sophisticated and technical plans 
and strategies having little relevance for the problems 
to be addressed. In an extensive study of MONUC, 
Autesserre (2008) describes this dynamic, where local 
conflict dynamics in the Congo were not understood 
and appreciated as important because of a privileging 
of universal knowledge: 
“Diplomats and UN officials … brought to their new po-
sition the knowledge they acquired in previous postings 
– and many approached the Congo exactly as if it was 
their previous country of deployment. [UN staff] found 
(or privileged) information indicating that violence in 
the east was a top-down problem. The UN Secretary 
General reports on the Congo emphasized mostly the 
national and regional roots of violence.” (2008:15)
The point here is that the relevance of country-specific 
knowledge is always subordinate to the pre-defined 
universal principles that stipulate the goals of peace-
building: Knowledge about the particular geographi-
cal, social, economic, political characteristics of a 
country are considered important a means to the end 
of fine-tuning and adjusting, on the margins, how to 
implement a pre-defined liberal peacebuilding model, 
the establishment of which is seen to require heavy 
involvement by external experts. 
2. International legitimacy trumps local legitimacy
Peacebuilders increasingly recognize the importance 
of focusing on questions of legitimacy, both in terms 
of how external actors are perceived by the local popu-
lation, and in terms of how the general population in 
a country understand and perceives of the state that 
is to be built to prevent future conflicts (OECD-DAC 
2008). In seeking to operationalize this new emphasis 
on legitimacy, however, peacebuilders tend to assume 
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liberal principles that they advance will automatically 
translate into domestic legitimacy of the state as viewed 
by the local population. While the normative pull of lib-
eral principles is unmistakable, it is an open question 
whether different domestic groups see such principles 
as legitimate – especially when these are effectively be-
ing imposed from the outside rather than being devel-
oped through domestic debate and negotiations. 
In the new Capstone Doctrine for UN “multidimen-
sional” peacekeeping operations – including peace-
building efforts – the discussion of the normative 
framework that legitimizes peacekeeping is note-
worthy in this regard. The document does not list the 
local population’s beliefs, grievances, goals (e.g. per-
ceptions) as part of the core legitimacy for peace op-
erations. Instead, the legitimacy of peace operations, 
and peacebuilding efforts, is said to flow from a set of 
international sources, key among which are conform-
ity with human rights norms, the authority of the UN 
Security Council, and the authority of the UN Secre-
tary General (UN 2008: 36—39). Instead, local per-
ceptions are described more in the context of how it is 
necessary to manage the potential for misperceptions. 
The doctrine refers three times in a few paragraphs 
to how the “perceived legitimacy” of peacekeeping 
operations is affected by the quality of the conduct of 
peacekeepers. Here, “effective approaches to national 
and local ownership” is seen as important to “reinforce 
the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support 
mandate implementation.” (ibid. 39). 
To talk about the perceived legitimacy of a UN peace-
keeping operation, however, is to assume that their 
actual legitimacy does not depend on the views of the 
local population. Indeed, it is to assume that the inter-
national (liberal) standards that peace operations and 
peacebuilding efforts adhere to are what really provide 
them with legitimacy. Legitimacy is seen as synony-
mous with a particular normative standard in the form 
of ideas contained in the liberal peacebuilding model 
and it is thus possible that some actors “perceive” of 
this legitimacy in the wrong way – that they have mis-
perceptions about what is and what is not legitimate in 
a normative sense. 
This emphasis on international over domestic legitima-
cy is perhaps best expressed in how local ownership is 
conceptualized in the Capstone Doctrine: Whereas hu-
man rights are seen as defining for the normative order 
of peace operations – together with the UN charter, UN 
Security Council mandate, and international humani-
tarian law – ownership is included as “other success 
factors” that are derived from experience. In short, local 
ownership is not seen as part of the source from which 
peace operations and peacebuilding efforts derive their 
legitimacy. In this way, the Capstone doctrine reflect a 
view that is generic to peacebuilding inasmuch as the 
substantive goals are defined by reference to a universal 
standard that takes precedence over domestic sources 
of legitimacy that may be at odds with these. 
The two assumptions about the superiority of univer-
sal knowledge and of international legitimacy under-
pin the rationale and organization of peacebuilding ef-
forts, and they help explain why respect for local own-
ership and sensitivity to local conditions is so difficult 
to implement in practice. In this framework, universal 
templates are privileged, external actors assume the 
position of experts, and legitimacy is believed to follow 
from the assumed normative force and universal ac-
ceptance of the international standards that underpin 
peacebuilding. This leads to a relative marginalization 
of local knowledge and of local sources of legitimacy. 
A way forward
There are evidently no easy fixes to this problem. The 
belief in social engineering and in the automatic, uni-
versal, legitimacy of peacebuilding is deeply institu-
tionalized in the thinking and practice of peacebuild-
ing. Indeed, adjusting the ends and means of peace-
building to make it fit in with the local context and 
the “political will” of key local groups can be a highly 
complex and politically very difficult task. Should one, 
for example, seek to foster ownership by building on 
local institutions even when doing so means support-
ing illiberal forms of rule? Is it appropriate to support 
national and local leaders in an interest of ownership 
and context-sensitivity when such leaders exhibit clear 
signs of ruling in undemocratic ways? These are all 
difficult ethical and political questions that are far be-
yond the scope of this report. Below, I identify three 
issues that can potentially contribute to improving the 
chances that peacebuilding efforts will be more sus-
tainable over time: i) debate about the tenets of the lib-
eral peacebuilding model inside and outside the UN; 
ii) organizational reform at the UN, and iii) training, 
hiring and best practices. 
i) Debate about whether the liberal peacebuilding 
model should always and a priori define the content 
and goals of peacebuilding efforts appears of central 
importance. Inasmuch as mandates, funding and 
guidance of peacebuilding efforts are driven and in-
formed by a particular image of peacebuilding as the 
advancement of liberal-democratic ideals, it is all the 
more difficult to reflect on and discuss whether other 
goals should take priority and whether a more plural-
istic reading of these liberal principles could be estab-
lished as the baseline for peacebuilding efforts. There 
is, for example, a strong argument to be made that 
only when external actors allow for liberal principles to 
emerge much more from and through domestic debate 
and contestation – rather than being already defined 
by external actors – will peacebuilding efforts be sus-
tainable and “owned” by the population in question. 
This would have to be discussed at a political and dip-
lomatic level to effectuate changes in the modus oper-
andi of peacebuilding.
ii) Based on the analysis above, the problem with peace-
building is that there is too much emphasis on build-
ing – on the idea that the peace is there to be built by 
outsiders and their expertise rather than assisted, cul-
tivated, facilitated and mediated. Highlighting facilita-
tion, mediation and conflict resolution as core features 
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of peacebuilding would arguably take the edge off the 
arrogance of peacebuilding, and would help peace-
builders see the problem in a more nuanced and con-
text specific way. In the current institutional set up of 
peacebuilding efforts at the UN, however, mediation, 
facilitation and local conflict resolution is emphasized 
largely in the phase before post-conflict peacebuilding 
kicks in, in the form of high-level peace talks and good 
offices functions of the UN. Moreover, both country 
specific knowledge and good offices functions, such as 
diplomatic negotiations and facilitation, is the purview 
of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Often, 
the working relationship between DPA and DPKO is 
suboptimal, owing to classic turf-battles for resources, 
competence and decision-making authority. Identify-
ing mechanisms to both expand in-house country spe-
cific knowledge and bring the expertise on facilitation, 
mediation and conflict resolution to bear on how peace 
operations and peacebuilding are defined and organ-
ized may be one avenue to explore in more detail.
iii) One area that is ripe for efforts to redress this prob-
lem is the recruitment policies and not least training 
of individuals that are charged with planning, manag-
ing and implementing peacebuilding efforts. Devel-
oping new training modules, new best practices and 
operational guidelines would – over time – introduce 
a higher level of sensitivity about and reflection on the 
tensions and dilemmas involved in peacebuilding, not 
least with regards to ownership. By emphasizing the 
ideals of facilitation, mediation and conflict resolu-
tion in both training courses, in hiring decisions, and 
in operational guidelines, the organizational culture 
and established “ways of doing things” within key UN 
organizations may gradually evolve to be less “blind” 
and “arrogant”.
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